Ministry of Justice's draft extends Sect. 299 StGB to corrupt practices that involve a breach of duties beyond business competition.
C. Critical Analysis of the Draft
In the past, the German parliament mostly implemented criminal law requirements of international anti-corruption instruments by means of Nebengesetzen (auxiliary laws). This approach of bypassing the StGB has been criticized many times before. 7 The draft suggests to include the central provisions of the EU-Bestechungsgesetz (EUBestG -EU-Anti-Corruption Act), the On the other hand, it is not convincing that Art. 2 Sect. 2 IntBestG on active bribery involving foreign and international parliamentarians shall not be altered. The governmental draft does not deal with corruption involving members of parliament since the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) is working on a specific draft, 9 but a mere inclusion of the unaltered provision into either Sect. 335a StGB on foreign and international officials or Sect. 108e StGB on members of parliament would make it much more accessible. It does not seem to make sense that the Federal Ministry of Justice excluded this provision from its strategy to make the anti-corruption legislation more accessible, especially since it is not foreseeable when the Bundestag will finally come up with its draft. Moreover, integrating Art. 2 Sect. 2 IntBestG as soon as possible in the StGB would make it even more obvious that current antibribery provisions dealing with German parliamentarians are much weaker than those concerning members of foreign assemblies and assemblies of international organizations. The latter rules do not confine the criminal offense to buying or
selling a vote. 10 The Federal Ministry of Justice's approach of not touching Art. 2 Sect. 2 IntBestG also means that the criminal offense of bribery involving foreign and international parliamentarians is likely to stay restricted to corruption in international business transactions, whereas the draft suggests to abolish this restriction with regard to foreign and international officials.
There are currently four groups of officials to which different anti-corruption criminal provisions apply: (1) German public officials, (2) public officials of other EU member states and officials of the EU institutions, (3) officials of the International Criminal Court, and (4) other foreign and international officials. 11 In the light of these rather unsystematic regulatory differences, scholars have suggested to harmonize the separate anti-corruption criminal offenses. 12 The governmental draft rightly abolishes the differentiation between officials of EU member states and other foreign officials. There shall be uniform rules on bribery involving foreign and international officials, and the restriction of the criminal offense to international business transactions shall be eliminated. It is also worthy of mention that with regard to passive bribery involving foreign and international officials, the draft goes beyond the international minimum requirements. In the past, the Bundestag mostly confined its implementation legislation to the minimum requirements of the respective international anti-corruption instruments.
The draft rightly equates officials of the EU institutions with German public officials regarding active and passive bribery (Sect. 332 and 334 StGB). This means an extension of the present legislation concerning European officials since the accepting or giving of advantages for a past breach of duties is currently not penalized. Once again, the draft goes beyond the international minimum requirements. Nevertheless, compared to the provisions on officials of the International Criminal Court, these improvements seem suboptimal. With regard to officials of the ICC, the present law even penalizes acceptance or giving of advantages for future action without a breach of duties. The Federal Ministry of Justice justified its proposal to slightly extend the provisions concerning European officials by highlighting Germany's advanced integration into the EU. 13 12 See Sanchez-Hermosilla, supra note 7, at 77, and Wolf, supra note 2, at 792. 13 See Bundesministerium der Justiz, supra note 3, at 30.
emerging international criminal law regime. 14 Thus, despite the above mentioned improvements, the draft does not reduce the number of groups of officials to which different anti-corruption criminal provisions apply: There still shall be four groups, albeit differently defined. 15 The current criminal offense of corruption in the private sector (Sect. 299 StGB) primarily protects free business competition. 16 However, a comparative view shows that most states prefer to protect individual companies by focussing on a breach of duties within a principal-agent relationship. 17 The draft rightly suggests to extend the present German law to corrupt practices that involve a breach of duties by employees beyond business competition (new Sect. 
D. Corruption Involving Members of Parliament
The criminal offense of bribery involving members of parliament (Sect. 108e StGB) is currently limited to buying or selling a vote in the plenary or the committees. This provision does not meet international requirements any more 19 and has been criticized as symbolic legislation. 20 In its draft, the Federal Ministry of Justice does not deal with corruption involving German, foreign, and international parliamentarians since the Bundestag intends to develop a specific bill. 21 However, the members of parliament have to decide on their own account in this case and did not show much willingness to tackle the problem in the past. 22 Thus, even if the Bundestag quickly adopted the governmental draft, the ratification and implementation of anti-corruption instruments signed by Germany up to seven years ago might be further delayed.
The Bundesregierung (Federal Government) should be more courageous and use its agenda-setter role to put the Bundestag under pressure by including in its draft provisions to implement international requirements regarding corruption involving members of parliament. In their vaguely announced bill, German parliamentarians are likely not to go beyond the international minimum requirements anyway. This makes it even easier for the Federal Ministry of Justice to supplement its draft, e. g. by taking Art. 2 Sect. 2 IntBestG as a model. 23 One should remember that the IntBestG, which introduced, inter alia, the criminal offense of active bribery of German parliamentarians as members of assemblies of international organizations, was drafted by the Federal Government. It was quickly adopted by the Bundestag in 1998.
